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Th& paper examines the economic policy implications of international migration  and 
human  capital  accumulation  within  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model.  Each 
country produces  by means of physical and human capital of two types  (skilled and 
unskilled  labour).  Alon9  optimal growth paths in a  worm of diverging population 
growth  rates  immigration  can only  be beneficial  when  the free rider effect  (ie not 
paying for  training  costs)  exceeds  the  capital  dilution  effect  of  an  increase  in 
population  growth.  Under quite general conditions  the optimal immigration  rate is 
zero. 
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Economies  with  ageing  populations  are  considering 
more often selective immigration as a  policy alterna- 
tive to alleviate domestic labour market pressures. The 
reason for considering this alternative is quite obvious. 
Stimulating  the  national  welfare  level  by  means  of 
investment in education involves sacrifices which can 
be avoided by attracting skilled labour from abroad. 
This paper examines the question whether the easy 
way out -  a selective immigration policy and immigra- 
tion  in  general  -  is  indeed  beneficial  for  all  parties 
concerned  ie  the  host  and  the  source  country.  This 
question  has some relevance to developing countries 
since discussions about migration are sometimes held 
in  partial  equilibrium  terms  (see  Simon  and  Heins 
[23]), thereby neglecting the costs developing countries 
have to bear for the welfare of the developed world. 
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The  welfare  point  of view  taken  in  this  paper boils 
down  to  the  following  principle  of  optimality: 1  a 
migration  flow  between  countries  can  only  be  con- 
sidered  a  merit if it enhances  welfare in at least one 
country, without reducing welfare in other countries. 
The opinion of the man in the street would be that a 
brain  drain  is  always  beneficial  to  the  country  of 
immigration  and  detrimental  to  the  welfare  of  the 
country  of emigration.  The  reason  why  this  is  only 
one  side  of the  story  is  the  preoccupation  with  the 
training  costs and  the  neglect  of the capital require- 
ments arising from a changing population growth rate. 
An increase in the aggregate population growth rate 
makes a  country relatively labour abundant  and the 
general  equilibrium  effect  is  a  decreasing  capital/ 
labour ratio with a negative effect on production and 
consumption  per  capita.  The  reverse  applies  to  the 
case of a  decline in the population growth  rate. This 
effect  is  better  known  as  the  capital  dilution  effect. 
These two effects on welfare -  the free rider effect of 
education  and  the  capital  dilution  effect  -  are  of 
opposite signs and  imply that countries  face a  trade 
~ff. Experience shows that most countries restrict the 
1  See for a discussion of the welfare criteria and consequences of 
the brain drain, Quibria [17], Bhagwati and Rodriguez [2] and 
Rodriguez [20]. 
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flow  of migrants.  There exists  an  asymmetry  in  the 
treatment  of migrants.  Emigration  is  a  basic  human 
right  established  by  the  United  Nations  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (it states: 'Everyone has 
the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return  to his  country.'). The right  of immigration 
into a  country is,  however, not  recognized by inter- 
national law. Examination of the welfare consequences 
of international  migration  can  therefore shed  some 
light on positive questions  of public choice: why are 
migration flows often restricted by governments? And 
why  are  immigrants  more  likely to  be  restricted  to 
move than emigrants? To merely examine the positive 
question  in  which  direction  migration  patterns  will 
evolve is  likely  to  be  a  trivial  question  in  a  world 
economy  with  different  production  technologies,  2 
since a migrant's economic motives are simply inspired 
by the prospect of improving his or her living standard. 
When  the  living  standard  in  one country is  perma- 
nently  higher  than  the  standard  of  living  of  the 
neighbouring country, the country with a lower living 
standard  will experience an exodus (as  remarked  by 
Galor and Stark [8]). It would therefore seem a more 
worthwhile  approach  to  explain  why  and  when 
governments restrict migration. A two-country general 
equilibrium  model  is  constructed  to  examine  this 
question.  A  composite  commodity  is  produced  by 
means of physical capital, skilled and unskilled labour. 
International lending and borrowing are excluded as 
means to finance investment. Capital is assumed to be 
restricted  to  domestic  production.  Immigration  is 
assumed to be controlled by the social planners, while 
they have no control over emigration. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. First,  I will 
show in the next section, as a matter of acquaintance, 
the mechanics of the human capital model in autarky. 
Later  on  it  will  serve  as  a  standard  of  argument 
in  tackling  the  question  whether  countries  should 
engage in an international labour market. The follow- 
ing  section  derives  the  comparative  statics  of  the 
autarkic economic system. The welfare consequences 
of immigration policies in a demographically divided 
world economy are then discussed, and  the reader is 
offered  a  steady-state  simulation  of  the  economic 
consequences  of  the  brain  drain  for  a  variety  of 
economies. The final section sums up. 
Human capital accumulation in autarky 
The following analysis of human capital accumulation 
is set in a continuous time version of the neoclassical 
2  In the past few years we have witnessed an increase in general 
equilibrium analyses of international migration: see, eg Ethier [5], 
Galor [7], Tu [24] and Kondo [15]. 
model.  The optimal  resource allocation problem for 
a  social planner can be given in the following terms. 
A  social  planner  has  as  a  policy  objective  the 
maximisation of the instantaneous utility of consump- 
tion per capita ie U[C(t)/L(t)],  by means of the invest- 
ment rate in physical capital, s(t),  and the investment 
rate in human capital at time t, v(t): 
Maximize Vo =  e-PtU[c(t)] dt  (1) 
s,t~ 
where  p  denotes  the  rate  of  time  preference.  The 
instantaneous  utility  function  satisfies  the  following 
conditions (where: R + = [0, oc)): 
Assumption  1  U: R+--+R  with  U'>0,  U"<0 
and 
lim U'(c)=  +  oo and  lim U'(c)= 0 
Investment in physical and human capital take up part 
of the national  product  Y(t).  Rewriting the  national 
income identity we obtain an expression for consump- 
tion per capita: 
C(t) = [1 -  s(t)- v(t)] Y(t)  (2) 
where  v(t)  is  the  investment  rate  in  human  capital. 
The technology describing production y(t) per unit of 
labour  (= Y/L)  is  represented  by  the  standard  neo- 
classical  production  function  Zf(.).  The  production 
function f(.) is  homogeneous of degree  1 in  terms of 
physical capital (k -  K/L) and the two types of human 
capital: untrained or 'raw' labour (as a fraction of the 
population:  h "=_H"/L)  and  trained  or skilled  labour 
h s (-HS/L).  A  country has  to  produce  by means  of 
both types of labour; it cannot completely specialize 
in either 'skilled labour' intensive or 'unskilled labour' 
intensive  production.  The  reason  for  educating  the 
labour  force  is  quite  straightforward:  the  marginal 
productivity of skilled  labour is  higher  than  that  of 
unskilled labour. The present analysis abstracts from 
the  time  that  is  needed  to educate the  labour force. 
Although this might seem like a  blatant refutation of 
reality,  the  abstraction  of 'schooling  time'  helps  to 
focus on the most direct aspects of migration. A model 
that  distinguishes  two types of labour but also 'time 
to  build'  human  capital  is  presented  in  Van  Imhoff 
([11],  Chapter  6.2).  The  production  technology  is 
described by the following Inada assumptions: 
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Assumption 2 
f: R + ~R + with Of/Oxi > 0, 02f/Ox~ < O, 
02f /Oxi Ox i > O, (OZf / Ox~)(O2f /Ox~) -  (c'~2f  / Ox, 0x  j)  2 > 0 
for i ¢j and x = (k, h ~, h") 
No  'free  lunch':  f(O, hS, hU)=f(k,O,  1)=f(k,l,0)=, 
lira Of~Ok = oo and  lira Of/Ok = 0 
k~O  k~oo 
lim Of/Oh ~ and  lim Of/Oh~e(O,1) 
hs~O  hs~ l 
In  deciding  upon  the  investment  rates  the  social 
planner has to value the increase of an extra unit of 
physical  and  human  capital.  The  prime  distinction 
between human and physical capital is that when an 
individual dies the human capital is instantly lost, but 
the accumulated physical capital stock is kept in use. 
To incorporate the aspect of mortality I  assume that 
the  aggregate  rate of population growth is  n = b-7, 
where b denotes the (constant) rate of fertility and Y 
the  (constant)  mortality  rate.  We  can  express  the 
development  of the  capital  assets  by  the  following 
differential equations: 
= s(t)Y(t)- 6rK(t)  (3) 
I2p = v(t) Y(t)/t  1 -  8uH~(t) -  7H~(t)  (4) 
or in labour intensive terms: 
k(t)>~O  and  O<~h~(t),  hU(t)<~l  (10) 
Differentiating constraint (6) with respect to time we 
can  see  that  the  growth  rate  of the  labour  force  is 
divided up in a weighted sum of skilled and unskilled 
labour force growth: 
n=  .hS(t)+  .hU(t)  (11) 
HS(t)  H"(t) 
The restriction on the control variables amounts to: 
O<~ v(t)+ s(t)<~ l  (12) 
The optimization problem will be solved by means of 
Pontryagin's maximum principle. The corresponding 
current-value  Hamiltonian  can  be  formulated  as 
follows: 
H(s, v, k, h ~, 2, kt) =  U[c(t)] 
+ 2(t)[s(t)y(t)-  (rr + n)k(t)] 
+ #(t)[v(t)y(t)/q 
-  (rH + n + y)hS(t)]  (13) 
In  general,  if  an  investment  policy  (s,v)  and  the 
associated accumulation path (k, h9 are to be optimal, 
the following differential equations must be satisfied: 
ill =  s(t)y(t)-  (6 K +  n)k(t) 





Following Ritzen ([18], Chapter 3) human capital is 
accumulated  through  an  educational  process  which 
involves training costs of q, to be associated with the 
training of a  unit of unskilled labour to the level of 
skilled labour. The formation of human capital uses 
up part  (v) of the  national  product.  Physical capital 
depreciates through the use of capital in the produc- 
tion process. Human capital depreciates through the 
deterioration of health  and  erosion (ie forgetfulness) 
or obsolence of skills. The depreciation rate of human 
capital, 6u, will in general differ from the depreciation 
rate  of physical  capital,  6x.  The  constraints  on  the 
state variables amount to: 
I~ = sy -  (6K + n)k  (14) 
l~  ~ = vy/rl -- (6 H + n + 7)h  ~  (15) 
,~=-[U'(c).(l-s-v)+2s+~l  L' 
+ 2(6  K  + n + p)  (16) 
fi=-[U'(c).(1-s-v)+2s+~]Aw 
+ ft(rH + n+ P + ~)  (17) 
lime - p' U'[c(t)] k(t) = 0  (18) 
t~oO 
lira e- ptq U,[c(t)]hs(t) = 0  (19) 
H~(t) + H"(t) = L(t)  (8) 
or 
h~(t) + h"(t) =  1  (9) 
where Aw = w  s -  w  u = Oy/dh ~ -  @/Oh u. A necessary con- 
dition  (Kuhn-Tucker) for an  inequality constrained 
optimization problem is that the control variables are 
chosen  so  that  the  Hamiltonian  and  the  related 
Lagrangean  (or  generalized  Hamiltonian)  L  are 
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maximized at any point in time. The Lagrangean is: 
L = H  +pl s +p2 v + p3(1 -s-  v)y  (20) 
First order conditions for a  maximum are: 
0L 
--  =(~-- U'[c])y + pl --p3Y=O 
c~s 
PlS=0  Pli>O  (21) 
0L 
~-  = (/t/t/- U'[c])y + P2 -  P3 Y = 0  uv 
p2/J=0  p2/>0  (22) 
therefore of some interest to know whether the steady 
state exists and whether it is unique. A steady state is 
defined by the constancy of per capita levels of capital 
and percentage of skilled labour: 
/~=0  and  /~*=0  (25) 
Under such conditions a  Golden Age equilibrium  ie 
a  resource allocation  which  cannot  be improved  by 
any alternative asset mix, is defined by the following 
conditions: 
~y 
-  p +  6~ +  n  (26) 
?k 
and  Aw/t/=p+6n+n+  7  (27) 
P3( 1 -- S -- v)y = 0  P3 >i 0  (23) 
Thus: 
(2-  U'[c])y + p, =(/t/t/- U'[c])y + p2 =p3Yi>0  (24) 
When  the  shadow price of investing a  small  part  of 
the  national  product exceeds the  marginal  utility of 
consuming that same part, the investment rate will be 
at its maximum, viz. the boundary value l. However, 
given  the  form of the  utility function such  a  choice 
can conveniently be ruled out. The minimum boundary 
value of zero cannot be ruled out as an optimal choice. 
Combining these conditions a  table of policy choices 
can be compiled (Table 1). 
Given the assumptions of the utility function we can 
safely exclude the last three policy options  in  which 
all output is saved: cases E, F  and  G.  These policies 
do however apply in the case of a linear utility function, 
u(.)=e(t). 
Optimal  control  solutions  for  two-state  variable 
problems  are  quite  complex  as  demonstrated  by 
Pitchford [-16]. The problems Pitchford discusses are 
restricted to independent state variables. The present 
problem,  however, involves two  interdependent  state 
variables  (and  constrained  control  variables).  It  is 
Equations (26) and (27) are the modified golden rules 
of  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation.  The 
existence  of  the  steady  state  is  warranted  by  the 
Inada conditions of the production technology: differ- 
entiate  Equations  (26)  and  (27)  with  respect to  time 
and one obtains the following system of equations: 
All  A 12]r]~ ]: 
A21  A22_jU~s  A  0  (28) 
where:  A i 1 =  O2Y/~k2  <  O,  A 12  ~"  A21  =  °2Y/ok c'~h~ 
-  ~2y/c~k~3h u >  0  and  A22 =  02y/(t~hS) 2 +  ~2y/(~hU)2 
-2.~.2y/ghSOhU<  O.  Given these  signs  a  steady state 
is possible. Uniqueness of the steady state follows from 
a  similar  kind  of reasoning.  If the marginal  produc- 
tivity  terms  of the  golden  rules  are  brought  to  the 
right-hand side of the equations we can conclude that 
the  map  (26)427)  is  globally  univalent.  This  is 
established  by  strict  concavity  of  Zf(.)  and  the 
property of the Jacobian matrix: the Jacobian matrix 
of this system is a  P-matrix: all principal minors are 
positive (ie  a  theorem proven by Gale  and  Nikaid6 
[6]).  We  will  assume  that  the  equilibrium  is  stable 
since it is outside the scope of this paper to examine 
extensively  the  stability  conditions  of  this  optimal 
Table I. Optimal investment  policies in autarky. 
Controls 
s  v  s+  v  ,t-  Ul[c] 
A  0  0  0  <0 
B  [0,1]  [0,1]  [0,1]  =0 
C  0  [0,1]  [0,1]  <0 
D  [0,1]  0  [0,1]  =0 
E  0  1  1  <0 
F  1  0  1  >0 
G  [0,1]  [0,1]  1  2>0 
Shadow prices 
~]~ -  U'[c]  Pl  P2 
<0 
=0  o  o 
=0  0 
<0  o 
>o  0 
<0  b 
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control problem with mixed constraints (see Seierstad 
and  Sydsaeter [21]). 
For the remainder  of the analysis I will confine the 
(numerical)  description  of  production,  y(t),  to  the 
following Cobb-Douglas  function,  with  constant  re- 
turns  to scale: 
y=Z.k~.(h~)/~.(h")~-~-l~  0<e+fl<l,  Z>0  (29) 
where ~ and fl are the income shares of physical capital 
and  skilled  labour;  Z  denotes  the  constant  level  of 
technology.  When  r/>0,  fin +7 >~fr  and  we are  in  a 
steady  state  situation  where  a  country  accumulates 
according to golden rules (26) and (27), the following 
equality of rates of return  exists: 
(1 -~-D 
h s  h u 
= q[~/k + (6n + ~ -  6K)/Y]  (30) 
This equality implies that the ratio of the income share 
of skilled  labour  and  the  stock  of skilled  labour  is 
always larger  than  the  ratio  of the  income  share  of 
unskilled  labour  and  unskilled  labour,  unless,  of 
course, physical capital depreciates much  faster than 
the sum of the depreciation  of human capital and the 
(constant) mortality rate. The golden rule of physical 
capital  accumulation  (26)  can  be  expressed  as  a 
function of hS: 
k  ~  P+fK+n  ~1/(~-~) 
= [~Zh~(1 -  hs)  (1 -~-#)J 
01) 
The golden rule of human capital accumulation (27) is: 
k-~  q(P+V+fn+n)  ~'/~ 
-  [QZh~(1 -  h~)  (1 -'-#'J 
(32) 
where 
(2=/3  (1-~-fl 
h  ~  h  u 
Equation (30) is also of importance in determining the 
range  of  optimal  steady  state  values.  A  general 
analytical  solution is not  possible here.  Only for the 
particular  case where 6r = fin + 7, the term expressing 
the equalization  of rates of return can be solved for k 
as a function  of h': 
r/.ct.h~(1 -h ~) 
k =  (33) 
fl--(1 -c~)h  s 
is only to be found in the interval  [0,fl/(1 -~)]: 
limk=~  and limk=-~  where ~=fl/(1-~)  (34) 
It can easily be seen that this solution is too complex 
to  solve  by  hand.  In  simulating  this  particular 
economy I have therefore used an interative procedure 
(viz.  a Newton-Raphson  algorithm). 
Comparative statics in autarky 
The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  see  how  the 
endogenous  variables  react  to changes  in  parameter 
values of the economy. The analysis is carried out for 
optimal  steady  states  under  conditions  of a  stable 
population.  Five  variables  are  of  interest  in  this 
section, viz. the investment rates s and v, the physical 
and human capital  stock, k and h  s, and consumption 
per capita, c. The comparative statics are derived from 
the golden rules (26) and (27), the optimal steady state 
control  variables,  which  can  be  derived  from  the 
following two equations: 
l~ = 0 = sy-  (fir + n)k  (35) 
h ~  = 0 = vyfll -  (fn + n + ?)h ~  (36) 
and the definition of consumption  per capita: 
c=(1 -s-v)Z.f(.)  (37) 
Total differentiation  of these five equations yields the 
following system of equations: 
Zfk~  Zf~h  0  0  O" 
Zfh~  Zf,  h  0  0  0 
-s.ZL-(~K+n)]  sZfh  Zf  0  0 
vZf~  [vZ  A  --(a  a + y + n)r/,]  0  Zf  0 
--Zfk(l--s--v)  --Zfh(l--s--v )  Zf  Zf  1 
"dk] 
dh  s 
dv 
dc 
"~  o  o  1  1  -A'  o 
0  r~  q  r~  q  -Aw  (p+~+fn+n I 
k  0  0  k  0  -sf  0 
0  qh ~  r/h  ~  qh  •  0  -vf  (Sn+y+n)h  ~ 







.dr/  . 
where: 
It must be clear that the optimal human capital stock  f~,k =  ~2f /~k2 < 0 
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Table  2.  Comparative  statics  in  autarky,  a 
Depreciation rate physical capital 
Depreciation rate human capital 
Time preference 




Endogenous  variables 
Physical  capital  Skilled  labour  Consumption 
Stock  Investment  Stock  Investment  per  capita 
rate  k  rate  s  /f  rate  v  C/L 
-  +  -  +  - 
+/-  -  +  - 
_  _  +/_  _ 
-  +  -  q.  - 
--  +I"--  --  4- 
--  4-/  --  4- 
+  +//--  +  --  + 
The signs are calculated for a range of plausible parameters. The signs of the investment rates are particularly ambiguous. 
Table  3.  Steady  state  allocations  in  autarky. 
For the parameters: ~=0.3,/1=0.5, Z= 7.0, ~/= 12.0, p =0.02, n=0.01, 6H =0.09, ~'=0.01, 6,~ =0.05 we calculate the benchmark: 
c  k  if  s  v  y 
Benchmark  11.2  58.4  68.3 %  22.5 %  5.8 %  15.6 
q = 5.0  11.7  58.5  70.2%  22.5%  2.5%  15.6 
= 15.0  10.9  58.3  67.5%  22.5%  7.2%  15.6 
= 20.0  10.6  58.2  66.1%  22.5 %  9.4 %  15.5 
Z=2.0  1.2  8.7  47.4%  22.5%  27.0%  2.3 
~4.0  4.5  26.0  64.0%  22.5%  12.2%  6.9 
= 10.0  19.2  97.4  69.6%  22.5%  3.5%  26.0 
n =0.01  13.4  88.2  69.1%  20.0%  4.2%  17.6 
~0.00  12.1  70.7  68.8%  21.4%  5.0%  16.5 
= 0.03  9.7  42.4  67.4%  24.0%  7.4%  14.1 
p = 0.00  [ 1.4  88.2  69.1%  30.0%  5.2%  17.6 
70.04  10.5  37.0  67.0%  16.4%  6.5%  13.6 
~0.11  9.1  19.7  63.6%  10.6%  7.5%  ! 1.2 
fl =0.30  10.6  53.6  39.1%  22.5%  3.6%  14.3 
=0.40  10.4  53.6  53.3%  22.5%  4.9%  14.3 
=0.55  12.1  63.3  76.2%  22.5%  6.0%  16.9 
x = 0.20  5.5  18.3  55.9 %  15.0%  10.1%  7.3 
= 0.25  7.6  32.2  61.9 %  18.7 %  7.9 %  10.3 
= 0.35  18.0  112.5  75.2%  26.2%  3.9%  25.7 
fkh = fhk = [O2f  /Ok Oh ~  -  ~2f  /~k ~h u] > 0 
fah ---- [O2f/OhS2 + ~zf/Oh"2 -  2.02f/dh s Oh u] < 0 
The determinant D of the matrix on the left-hand side 
of the equality sign is always positive (ie a non-singular 
solution), hence  the  inverse  matrix  exists.  Multipli- 
cation of this  inverse matrix with  the  matrix  on the 
right-hand  side  of the  equality sign  yields  a  matrix 
from which we can read the comparative statics of this 
economic system (a complete derivation is given in the 
appendix  to  this  paper).  Table  2  gives  the  reaction 
signs of the  five endogenous variables to  changes in 
parameters. 
All signs are in line with similar studies in this field 
(Van Imhoff and Ritzen [13]  and Van  Imhoff ]-12]). 
A  fall  in  the  level  of  training costs  gives  rise  to  a 
decrease in rates of investment in physical and human 
capital  and  an  increase  in  the  physical  and  human 
capital stock. Consumption per capita always profits 
from  such  a  fall.  One  can  also  see  that  changes  in 
human and physical capital stock  move in line with 
the state of technology. 
A  fall  in  the  population growth  rate  leads  to  an 
increase  in  the  human  and  physical  capital  stock, 
investment rates can drop due to the increased capital 
intensive  production  conditions  and  as  a  result 
consumption per capita will increase. Intuitively, this 
result  is  very  appealing  for  considering  the  conse- 
quences of an economy making the transition from a 
relatively  high  population  growth  rate  to  a  lower 
growth rate.  A  lower growth rate amounts along the 
optimal  growth  path  to  profitable  conditions  of 
investment in education and capital. Table 3 is added 
to gain a  quantitative insight in comparative statics. 
International migration and economic policy 
If  we  now  move  on  to  migration  patterns  under 
conditions of optimal capital accumulation, migration 
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may become part of economic policy.  The theory of 
optimal migration is closely  linked to the theory of 
optimal population growth (see Arthur and McNicoll 
[1]).  In the present  setting I  will only consider the 
possibility of an immigration policy and I exclude the 
possibility of stimulating people to leave the country. 
The question for a social planner is: given the ability 
to control the number of immigrants, what should the 
optimal immigration flow  be?  There  are  considera- 
tions which may make the optimal control of immigra- 
tion a complex problem. The first problem concerns 
the characteristics of individuals. Individuals are born 
in a country and we usually assume that their abilities 
and their preferences  are given once and for all. This 
assumption becomes quite untenable when we try to 
discuss  migration.  Once  the  migrants  (and  their 
children)  settle in the country of their choice, do they 
adapt  their characteristics to  those of the  domestic 
population or do  they remain the  same? Empirical 
studies (eg Chiswick  [3])  show that first-generation 
migrants still have origin specific characteristics, while 
later generation migrants can hardly be distinguished 
from the indigenous population. 
The second problem is concerned with the analysis 
of a non-stable population. Any economic system that 
is  inhabited  by  population  groups  with  different 
(positive) rates of reproduction will imply an average 
population growth rate that will always increase and 
at  the  limit  will  approach  the  rate  of  the  fastest 
growing population group. 
Last but not least, the choice between trained and 
untrained individuals leads to different effects on the 
human capital stock. Trained individuals of a  given 
level of education can simply be added to the existing 
stock; unskilled individuals will, however, have to be 
educated from scratch.  Difficulties  arise  when these 
untrained  migrants  differ  in  their  ability  to  learn. 
If  they  have  more  difficulty in  learning  than  the 
indigenous population, extra  costs  will  have  to  be 
incurred to transform them into skilled  workers. 
In the following subsections I will discuss  the way 
in  which  the  population growth  rate  is  affected  by 
migration, and conditions for optimal immigration. 
Demographics 
To demonstrate the complications divergent growth 
rates  imply,  some  demographic  accounting  is  per- 
formed. The  aggregate labour force  and  its  growth 
rate are defined as: 
L,(t) = La(t) + L~(t)-  L'i(t)  for  i= 1,2  (35) 
where superscripts  d,  m and  e  denote the  domestic 
population,  immigrants and  emigrants  respectively. 
There  are  two  extreme  options  in  dealing  with 
population growth rates:  the  birth  and  death  rates 
depend on the country of origin or birth, or the rates 
depend on the country of residence. We now illustrate 
the difference between these two definitions. 
Constant  characteristics.  Assume that migrants, wher- 
ever they are, have a constant preference  for children 
and their mortality rate is also constant. These rates 
differ from the growth rate in the country of destina- 
tion. Once they settle  in this country the aggregate 
population growth rate is defined by: 
La  L_ 
+ n,,'-7-  (37)  n~nd"  Z  L 
If the migrants (and their descendants) have a higher 
rate of increase than the indigenous population, the 
aggregate population growth rate will increase forever, 
approaching the migrant's rate of increase in the limit. 
In  a  two-country world, in  which the  growth  rates 
diverge, the world population is inherently non-stable. 
Only when fertility and mortality rates converge,  can 
we speak of a stable world population. A complication 
with the definition of the rate of migration is that it 
is  composed of the flow of migrants as  induced by 
economic forces  and the reproduction and mortality 
rate  of the  migrants.  Hence  in  a  steady  state  the 
country of emigration is only affected  in population 
size, but not in its growth rate. When time approaches 
infinity the equality of growth rates is simply a con- 
sequence of high fertility individuals 'crowding out' low 
fertility individuals (see for this point, Keyfitz [14]). 
High  fertility individuals  and  their  related  charac- 
teristics  (time  preference,  training  costs,  mortality) 
will  under  those  assumptions  dominate  the  world 
population. 
Changin9  characteristics.  Assume  that  once  the 
migrants settle in the country of their choice they adapt 
their behaviour, so after a small interval in time they 
can  hardly  be  distinguished  from  the  indigenous 
population.  This  implies  for  our  definition  of the 
aggregate growth rate (36) that a distinction between 
immigrants and domestic population is  useless. The 
only way in which the immigrants affect the popula- 
tion growth in the country of destination is at the time 
of entrance: 
Li  _  na..L~(t)  ,.  L~(t) _  n ~.'L~(t)  (36) 
~i-  Li(t )  '  Li(t) + ni  " Li(t)  '  Li(t) 
L,  L ~,  L? 
~bi- --  -  +  =n~ +n~  (38) 
Li(t)  Li(t)  Li(t) 
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It is this latter definition of migration that we will use 
in our analysis  of a  selective immigration  policy. Of 
course,  the  aggregate  population  growth  rate in  the 
country of emigration will now be affected due to the 
outflow of migrants. Note that the rate of immigration 
is  rarely  equal  to  the  rate  of emigration.  A  global 
steady  state  in  this  world  is  defined  by  equality  of 
aggregate population growth rates: ~,1 = ~b2. If country 
1  is  the  country  of  emigration  and  country  2  of 
immigration, this implies that neL 1 = nmL z. Given this 
simple  identity it  must  be  clear that  if country 2  is 
small  compared  to  country  1  (L2<<L1)  and  if  the 
number of immigrants  desired  by the  social planner 
of country 2 is positive, the emigration flow will be a 
negligible number for country 1. 
We  now  move  on  to  examine  some  cases  where 
population growth  rates, training  costs and  produc- 
tion technologies differ. To concentrate on questions 
of economic  policy  we  will  only  consider  interior 
solutions  of capital  investment.  We  can  derive  the 
immigration point of indifference for each of the two 
social planners, if we assume that the number of skilled 
and unskilled immigrants is controllable by the social 
planners. The first order conditions of the augmented 
Hamiltonian (10) become: 
t~H  i 
~n7 
-  2iki-pi(h~-I  ) 
I  ~  m__  m max  >  : ns --(ns) 
:  : 0 < rtS <(•sm)max 
~<0:n~'=0 
(42) 
Optimal  immigration 
Some of the differential equations describing the asset 
development change shape in an international setting. 
It should  be stressed that  the maximand (1) and  the 
current-value Hamiltonian remain the same. Only the 
number  of  control  variables  change.  The  social 
planners each maximize consumption per capita of the 
local population, irrespective of the nationality of the 
inhabitants.  Social  planners  can  only  control  the 
immigration flow and  not the emigration flow. Two 
additional assumptions are introduced: in conducting 
an  immigration  policy,  attracting  immigrants  is  a 
costless  activity, and  the  mortality  rates  in  the  two 
countries  are  identical,  71=72=7. 3  The  differential 
equations of physical and human capital now change 
to (for i= 1,2): 
ki = si(t)yi(t) -  (6K + ~b i)ki(t)  (39) 
1~ = v~(t)y,(t)/q,-  (6n + O, + y~)h~(t) + n~m  (40) 
/~' =  -  ti~  (41) 
As can easily be seen, the inflow of skilled and unskilled 
labour (n") affects the human capital stock as well as 
the physical capital stock in the country of immigra- 
tion.  A  qualification  should  be  made  at  this  point. 
Skilled and  unskilled labour are homogenous across 
the  two countries. There are  no adjustment  costs  in 
transforming the skilled migrants of a technologically 
backward  country to  the  requirements  of a  techno- 
logically advanced country.  4 
3 This assumption can also  be interpreted as the possibility that 
migrants immediately adopt the mortality rate of the country of 
destination. 
4A more comprehensive model of migration would include costs 
of adjusting migrants educated abroad to production conditions at 




-  2ik i-  Itih~i < 0: n~' = 0  (43) 
It  must  be  clear  from  the  above  conditions  that  a 
welfare maximizing social planner allows immigrants 
to enter the country as long as the level of welfare in 
case  of complete labour mobility is  higher than  the 
autarkic or restricted mobility level. Only for skilled 
labour are there beneficial shifts of labour imaginable. 
Unskilled  labour  merely  increases  the  population 
density  of  the  country  of  immigration  and  the 
subsequent  demands  on  investing  in  physical  and 
human  capital  to keep the migrants  fully employed. 
Hence the welfare level of the receiving country in this 
situation, where an immigration policy is  effected, is 
in general lower than the welfare level where a social 
planner abstains  from such  an effort (ie the autarky 
case). In the case of skilled immigrants the population 
density also increases, but a country saves on investing 
in human capital.  Hence there exist possibilities of a 
positive welfare effect of free trade  of skilled labour. 
The exact condition for allowing skilled migrants  to 
enter a  country has a  straightforward interpretation. 
Immigration of skilled labour should be attracted to 
the  point  where  the  capital  labour  ratio  equals  the 
cost of training the unskilled labour force (ie condition 
(42) is set equal to zero). Only if the autarkic situation 
in the country of immigration is  such  that  the costs 
attached  to training the unskilled  part  of the labour 
force  exceed  the  capital/labour  ratio  (ki<q~h~)  an 
immigration  policy  is  welfare  improving.  If  the 
situation  in  the  country  of emigration  is  a  mirror 
image  of its  neighbour  (ie  kj>qjhj,  where  i,j= 1,2 
and  i C j)  the  policy  will  be  beneficial  to  both 
countries. 
We should qualify this finding of a  selective social 
planner,  since unskilled  migrants  may differ in  their 
ability  to  learn.  If  we  modify  the  human  capital 
equation  to  take  account  of the  ability  to  learn  of 
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unskilled  immigrants  we  obtain  the  following  differ- 
ential equation: 
t~7 = vi(t)yi(t)/qf -  (6H + ~b, + 7i)h~(t) +  n~O(qj)  (44) 
where q~(.) describes the adjustment costs to transform 
an  unskilled  immigrant  into  a  skilled  worker  and  r/" 
and  t/d  denote  the  training  costs  of  an  unskilled 
immigrant and an unskilled member of the indigenous 
population,  respectively.  Generally  there  are  indeed 
additional  costs  attached  to  transforming  migrants 
(qJ < 0  if  r/j > r/i  ).  However,  the  presence  of  smarter 
immigrants  may  turn  the  'costs' into  gains  (qJ>0  if 
r/j < t/i  ), and a selective immigration policy may not be 
restricted  to merely skilled  labour. 
As a  final point of qualification,  in Ritzen and Van 
Dalen  [19]  an  additional  effect  is  mentioned  in 
evaluating  the  merits  of  the  immigration  of  skilled 
individuals,  viz.  a  foreign  capital  substitution  effect. 
When international  lending and borrowing is allowed 
for, the migration  rate will affect the rate of return on 
foreign  assets  and  as  a  consequence  the  amount  of 
borrowing  and lending. 
A  brain drain in the 'real' world 
This section discovers the various effects of migration 
by  attaching  numerical  values  to  the  parameters. 
Besides  the  practical  interest  to  know  how  this 
particular  system  works  the  simulation  is  used  to 
illustrate  the pros and cons of the brain drain and try 
and  trace the  size of the welfare losses and  gains. 
The  two  case  studies  examined  are  perhaps  at the 
forefront  of economic  policy. The first case examines 
two countries that decide to engage in an international 
labour market at a certain moment in time. Production 
technologies and population growth rates are identical, 
whereas the  training  costs differ. 
The second  case is concerned  with  the  brain  drain 
from  developing  countries  to  developed  countries. 
This  case  is  more  complex  since  not  only  do 
population  growth  rates and  training  costs differ but 
also the production technologies in the two regions of 
the world. 
Any equilibrium  in this world economy is assumed 
to  be  characterized  by  identical  population  growth 
rates,  qJ*,  so  that  we  can  perform  a  steady  state 
analysis.  Under  steady  state  conditions  the  optimal 
control  variables concerning  human  capital are: 
/i] = 0: v* -  (fin + ~k* + 7)h]*r/~  (45) 
h~ = 0: v* -  (6H +  ~* + 7)h~*r/2  (46) 
y~ 
and consumption per capita in both countries amounts 
to: 
c* = y* -  (6K + ~b*)k* -  (6  H + ~* + y)h] *r/, + nmr/1 
(47) 
c* = y~ -  (6 K +  ~,*)k~ -(6 u + ~k* + 7)h~*r/2 -  net/2 
(48) 
where neL2 = n~L 1. As one can see from the right-hand 
side  of  Equations  (47)  and  (48)  the  terms  nTr/1 
represents  the  free  rider  effect  of the  brain  drain  for 
which the country of emigration has to pay n~r/2. There 
are now two effects, which have to be calculated before 
a country introduces a brain drain: the capital dilution 
effect:  Ayi-Aki-Ah~q  i  for  i= 1,2,  versus  the  free 
rider effect: n~t/1  and n~q2. The condition for introduc- 
ing  a  brain  drain  amounts  to  a  positive  sum  of the 
capital  dilution  effect and  the  free  rider  effect  for  at 
least one of the countries without affecting the welfare 
of the  other country in a  negative manner. 
Table 4 shows some steady state simulations  of the 
Table 4. Parameters  used for the simulation, a 
I  It 
Country  Country 
!  2  1  2 
Technology Z  7.0  7.0  7.0  2.5 
Physical capital share ct  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Human capital share fl  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.2 
Birth rate b  0.0  0.03  0.0  0.03 
Mortality  rate ~,  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Training costs q  12.0  9.0  12.0  20.0 
Population  size L  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Depreciation  rate physical capital 6  r  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Depreciation  rate human capital fin  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Time preference p  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
For Table 7 we have used other training costs parameters, viz. for case I: ql = 150; q2 =9 and for case II: r/1 = 150; q2 = 10. 
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Table 5. A brain drain in the 'real' world. 
1  II 
n~ = 0  n~, = 0.015  n~, = 0  n~, = 0.015 
k~  49.3  39.5  49.3  39.5 
k2  32.7  39.6  6.7  8.3 
hi  67.9%  67.2%  67.9%  67.2% 
h~  67.8%  68.3%  10.9%  12.2% 
Yl  14.8  13.8  14.8  13.8 
3'2  13.1  13.9  2.7  2.9 
sl  13.3%  15.7%  13.3%  15.7% 
s2  17.5%  15.7%  17.5%  15.7% 
t'l  4.4%  5.5%  4.4%  5.5% 
l!  2  5.1%  4.2%  9.0%  8.0% 
cl  12.2  11.1  12.2  11.1 
c  2  10.1  11.0  2.0  1.9 
Free rider effect  i =  1  0.2  0.2 
Capital dilution effect  i = 1  -  1.3  -  1.3 
Free rider effect  i=2  -0.1  -0.3 
Capital  dilution effect  i=2  1.0  0.2 
Table 6. Public expenditures on education.  ° 
%  GNP  Per inhabitant (in US$) 
1965  1978  1965  1978 
Developed nations  5.1  5.9  86  366 
Developing nations  2.9  4.1  5  26 
Africa  3.4  4.8  6  29 
North America  5.4  6.6  187  622 
Europe  5.0  5.7  63  271 
Latin America  3.0  4.0  13  60 
Asia  3.5  5.0  7  55 
Data on private expenditures are generally lacking for developing countries and  for matters of comparability the  table is compiled with 
public expenditures figures, 
Source: Graham ([9], p409). 
brain  drain  for  constant  population  growth  rates. 
Simulations of the two cases are performed so as to 
reflect the  production per capita  figures  in  different 
parts  of the  world.  They must  be  seen  as  counter- 
factuals, since they show that a social planner conducts 
a  policy  which  lowers  welfare.  As  derived  in  the 
previous subsection, such an immigration policy will 
generally  not  be  executed.  Table  5  presents  the 
parameter values for the two simulated case studies. 
As  we  can  deduce  from  Table  4  human  capital 
intensity is not very much affected by the migration 
flow.  The  steady  state  welfare  implications  of  the 
integration of labour markets (ie case I) confirm what 
we  derived  above.  The  main  conclusion  from  this 
simulation  is  that  the  country of immigration loses, 
while  the  country  of  emigration  gains  from  inter- 
national integration. The investment rates in human 
capital for the two countries are in  line with  figures 
of public expenditures on education, as one can see in 
Table 6,  which gives an indication of the magnitude 
of public expenditures on education in 1965 and 1978. 
To  qualify  the  aggregate  figures  for  individual 
countries  it  suffices to  mention  that  among  the  big 
public  spenders  on education  in  1977  were  Sweden 
(US  $797  per  inhabitant),  Canada  (US$694  per 
inhabitant)  and  the  Netherlands  (US$646  per  in- 
habitant).  Although  the  vast  majority  of education 
spending  is  government financed the  figures change 
somewhat  when  private  spending  is  included.  If we 
combine public and private figures for these countries 
we obtain the following ranking: (1) Canada: US$833 
per inhabitant; (2) Sweden: US$805 per inhabitant; (3) 
USA: US$665 per inhabitant; and (4) the Netherlands: 
US$655 per inhabitant. 
Finally, I  want  to show that  a  brain drain  can be 
beneficial for both countries. Table 7 shows that when 
training  costs  are  excessively high  in  the  country of 
immigration, the free rider effect outweighs the capital 
dilution effect. Table 7 shows clearly that the human 
capital  structure  of  the  country  of  immigration 
changes  dramatically.  The effects for the  country of 
emigration  are  in  line  with  the  comparative  statics 
results given above. 
It should be noted that under conditions of identical 
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Free rider effect i= 1 
Capital dilution effect i =  1 
Free rider effect i = 2 
Capital dilution effect i= 2 
I  II 
n'm=0  n~,=0.015  n~,,=0  n~,=0,015 
21.5  12.9  21.5  12.9 
32.7  39.6  7.2  8.8 
14.3%  9.3%  14.3%  9.3% 
67.8%  68.30/0  16.8%  18.0% 
6.4  4.5  6.4  4.5 
13.1  13.9  2.9  3.1 
13.3%  15.7%  13.3%  15.7°/o 
17.5%  15.7%  17.5%  15.7% 
26.7%  29.4%  26.7%  29.4% 
5.1%  4.2%  6.4%  5.5% 
3.9  4.7  3.9  4.7 
10.1  11.0  2.2  2.3 
2.2  2.2 
-  1.4  -  1.4 
-0.1  -0.1 
1.0  0.2 
production technologies and plausible training costs 
there are no potential welfare  improvements (ie  the 
sum of welfare  of the two countries) possible  in the 
simulations  presented.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the 
equality of population sizes. There is, however, one 
straightforward  case  that  offers  potential  welfare 
improvements, ie the case of a very large country of 
immigration and a relatively small country of  emigration. 
As the demographic accounting above showed, we can 
arrive at a situation in which the immigrants hardly 
influence the aggregate population growth rate, whereas 
the migration flow could at the same time imply a 
substantial decrease  in  the  population growth  rate. 
Since the capital dilution effect dominates the free rider 
effect, this situation gives rise to an increase in average 
world welfare. 
Sensitivity analysis for the case of different income 
shares also yields the possibility of a potential welfare 
improvement  for  certain  production  and  training 
parameters. The reason for this possibility is  rather 
straightforward: developed  countries  produce  more 
human capital intensive than developing countries. A 
skilled migrant who moves from a developing country 
to a developed country is employed more effectively 
than in his home country, a fact which is expressed 
by  the  inequality of the  production  parameters  of 
skilled labour:/11 > f12. 
Conclusions 
Should the USA welcome graduates from Mexico or 
India?  Does  the  integration  of  domestic  labour 
markets  in  one  European  labour  market  form  a 
welfare  improving economic policy for all  countries 
concerned?  These  are  questions  at  the  forefront 
of  economic  policy  debates  (see Greenwood  and 
McDowell [10]  and Simon [22])  which have yielded 
different answers at different times. The present paper 
has analysed the  welfare  consequences of the  brain 
drain  and  migration  in  general  in  a  two-country 
general equilibrium model. Each country produces by 
means  of physical capital  and  two  types of labour 
(skilled  and  unskilled).  If social  planners  strive  for 
optimal  per  capita  welfare,  the  brain  drain  will 
only  be  an  optimal  policy  action  under  a  limited 
number  of economic  states.  Along  optimal  growth 
paths in a  world with divergent population growth 
rates there are essentially two effects to be taken into 
consideration: the capital dilution effect, and the free 
rider effect if migrants are already educated. We could 
add a third effect: if migrants are not yet trained, and 
the learning ability of migrants as represented by the 
training costs per unit of labour is lower than that of 
the indigenous population a  country might save  on 
education expenditures. However, under quite general 
conditions the optimal immigration rate is zero. There 
are,  however,  possibilities  for  a  positive  aggregate 
world welfare effect of international migration. If the 
country of immigration is  sufficiently  large and the 
country of emigration sufficiently  small,  the sum  of 
welfare effects of international migration is likely to 
be positive. This possibility, however, assumes that the 
country that  gains from migration will  compensate 
the  losing  country.  Explicit  international  transfers 
between governments is however a phenomenon that 
is not very likely to occur and quite difficult to design 
and execute (see Bhagwati [2]). 
The overall practical conclusion of this paper must 
be that countries are well advised to educate their own 
labour forces and not introduce a selective immigration 
policy. An extra reason for abstaining from a selective 
immigration policy is the consequent widening of the 
divergence  in dynamic efficiency in capital accumu- 
lation,  Developing countries  invest  far  too  little  in 
education  at  present  and  instituting  a  brain  drain 
ECONOMIC MODELLING October 1993  427 hTternational mi,qration, economic polio)' and human  capital accumulation.  H.P. van Dalen 
would  hardly  affect  the  population  growth  rate  and 
would  harm  the  human capital  stock  significantly. 
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Appendix 
Comparative statics of a model of 
human capital accumulation 
As a reference to the comparative statics analysis above the 
inverse  matrix,  A  1, of reaction  coefficients is  given.  The 
comparative statics can be obtained by multiplication  with 
the matrix of parameter coefficients,  B. 
-  1 
d~K 
"dk  [d6n 
I 
dh  I d7  i 
ds  = A-1.B.  dn  I 
I 
dv  dp  I 
.dc  L d~ldZ I 
where 
and 
"BI1  B21 
BI2  B22 
A  l=l/Det.  Bls  B2s 
BI4  B24 
B15  B25 
B= 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
Bss  0  0 
B34  B44  0 
B35  B,~5  B55 
"1  0  0  1  1  --fk'  0 
0  q  rl  r  I  rl  -Aw  (p+y+fu+n) 
k  0  0  k  0  -sf  0 
0  tlh  ~  tlh  ~  tl  h~  0  -vf  (3+y+n)h  ~ 
0  0  0  0  0  (1-s-v)f  0 





Bx3 = y(A21syh-A22A3t)>O 
B14 =  y(A2aA42- A22A41) 
B, s = y2 { _ A2 ,(sy  h + A, 2 + A,2) + Azz(A 3 x +  A41 -  A51)} 
B22 =Ally2 <0 
B23 =  -- y(Attsyh+A12A31)>O 
B24= _  y(A 11A42+A12A41) 
325= -- y2{A11[syh+(A,2-A52)] 
+  A12EA31 +(vy  k -A51)] } <0 
B33=(AttA22-A~2)y>0 
B34 =  y(A42A11 -- Al2vyk) 
B35 =  -  y2{AlI[A22+(A42-A52)] 
-A12(A21 -  vyk + Ast) } <0 
B44=(AlI A22- AI22)Y  >O 
B,*5 =  --(A11A22 -- A22)y  2 <0 
Bss=(AllA22-A22)y2>O 
All = Z~2f  /~k2 <O 
At2 = A2~ = ZEc~2f  /~k Oh  ~  -- 02f  /c3k Oh"] > 0 
A 22 = Z[O2f/Oh  '2 + O2f/~h"2 -  2. (?2f/Oh~ Oh  ~] < 0 
A31 =sy~-(3+n)<O 
A4t =vyk>0 
A42 =  vYh -- (~ + 7 + n)t/< 0 
A51 =  -- yk(1-s--v)<0 
A52= -  yh(1-s-v)<0 
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